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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 




MARQUIS A. LOPEZ  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. No. 10-cr-00067-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 6, 2015 
 
Before:   FUENTES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 15, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 The government appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware granting Marquis Lopez a new trial after his conviction for 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and for two related 
firearm offenses.  Before trial, the District Court had granted the government’s in limine 
motion authorizing the admission into evidence of Lopez’s 2001 state conviction for a 
similar offense, namely possession with intent to deliver heroin.  In granting the 
government’s multi-part motion, however, the Court focused on a different aspect of the 
motion – the question of whether certain surveillance evidence was admissible – and it 
provided no rationale for admitting the 2001 conviction.  Thus, when it considered 
Lopez’s request for a new trial, the Court concluded that the absence of any justification 
for the admission of the prior conviction warranted a new trial.  We agree with the 
District Court’s thoughtful analysis and will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 On July 6, 2010, Lopez was charged in a three-count indictment with possession 
with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The 
charges stemmed from a traffic stop on Interstate 95, during which police officers found 
over 100 grams of heroin and a firearm in a hidden compartment under a rear seat in the 
car Lopez was driving.  On March 14, 2014, following a five-day trial, a jury convicted 
Lopez of all three counts of the indictment.  A central issue at trial was Lopez’s 
knowledge that the drugs and gun were in the vehicle’s hidden compartment at the time 
of arrest. 
 In the four years between charge and trial, a number of issues were litigated.  
Lopez filed multiple motions to suppress, all generally involving evidence about the 
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vehicle’s whereabouts obtained using Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology.  
The government filed motions in limine dealing chiefly with the same issues.  Due to the 
changing legal landscape related to GPS technology during that time, see United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the District Court issued multiple decisions on those 
motions. 
 In one of its in limine motions related to the GPS data, the government also 
sought, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), to admit evidence of Lopez’s 2001 
Delaware Superior Court conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin, as proof 
of knowledge and intent.  The government argued that admission of the prior drug 
conviction would demonstrate Lopez’s “familiarity with the subterfuge and concealment 
inherent in drug trafficking,” making it less likely that he would be ignorant of the illicit 
contents of the hidden compartment in the car he was driving.  (App. at 103.) 
 The District Court granted the government’s motion in its entirety, but in its 
written opinion it addressed only the issues related to electronic surveillance and GPS 
technology.  Later, noting the development of further case law on the subject, the Court 
ordered additional briefing and issued a second opinion granting the government’s 
motion without any discussion of Lopez’s 2001 conviction.1  In short, the Court allowed 
the admission of Lopez’s prior conviction but did not provide any rationale for doing so. 
                                              
 1 The prior conviction was referenced in the concluding sentence of the District 
Court’s first of the two orders granting the government’s motion: “For the foregoing 
reasons, the court hereby denies Lopez’s Second Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 90) 
and grants the government’s First Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of Other Acts 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (D.I. 82).”  (App. at 130.)  In its second 
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 Given the Court’s ruling, the following stipulation was read into evidence at the 
conclusion of the government’s case: 
The United States, by and through its attorneys, Charles M. Oberly, III, 
United States Attorney for the District of Delaware; and Shawn A. Weede, 
Assistant United States Attorney; John S. Malik, Esquire, attorney for the 
defendant; Marquis A. Lopez, and the defendant, Marquis A. Lopez, hereby 
stipulate and agree that, prior to the date alleged in Count 3 of the 
indictment (on or about June 3, 2010), the defendant, Marquis A. Lopez, 
was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a narcotic Schedule 1 
controlled substance, to wit, heroin, on July 2nd, 2001, in Superior Court in 
and for New Castle County, Delaware, in ID No. IN0103007453, and 
Criminal Action No. 01-03-1534. This is a felony crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 
 
(App. at 411.)   
 At a sidebar conference immediately after the stipulation was read to the jury, the 
District Court indicated it was “shocked” at the nature of the stipulation.  (App. at 412.)  
After a brief recess, the District Court again summoned counsel to sidebar and expressed 
its concern that the evidence could be seen as “propensity evidence” and that they have to 
“keep the playing field level here.”  (App. at 412.)  After the government’s attorney 
described the Court’s prior ruling, the District Court asked him to “[r]emind me of the 
motion and the Court’s ruling on that.”  (App. at 412.)  The Court stated that it was 
“ex[e]rcised about it” and did not remember the ruling.  (App. at 412.)  The Court further 
indicated that it was “not sure that that was the correct ruling.”  (App. at 412.)  In the 
Court’s words: “I just cannot imagine what would be more vivid evidence of propensity, 
which is certainly not what you want this jury to base its conviction on.”  (App. at 412.)  
                                                                                                                                                  
order, the District Court used a verbatim concluding sentence in “reaffirm[ing]” its prior 
decision.  (App. at 148.) 
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After further discussion, the Court noted that “there are legitimate reasons for the 
conviction to come in as articulated in the previous ruling,” though, as stated, the 
previous ruling contained no such reasoning.  (App. at 413.) 
 After the guilty verdict, Lopez filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a).  He submitted that it was error for the Court to admit 
the evidence of his conviction without some indication in the record that the prior crime 
and the charged crime were “in any way factually similar.”  (App. at 39.)  He argued that 
he “was unfairly prejudiced and denied his right to a fair trial” because of the admission 
of the conviction, “since it was likely that the jury used this evidence to conclude that he 
was a bad person with a propensity to commit crimes.”  (App. at 39.)  In a supporting 
memorandum of law, Lopez discussed the District Court’s failure to justify the admission 
of the conviction in either of its written opinions. 
 The District Court granted the motion.  Setting aside the merits of whether the 
prior conviction should have been admitted into evidence, the Court acknowledged that it 
had “not provide[d] any supportive reasoning on the record for its [earlier] decision.”  
(App. at 15.)  It concluded that it had erred in assessing only the GPS evidence and 
ignoring the additional issues included in the government’s motion in limine.  The Court 
said that, “[i]n light of the lack of a record to support the court’s Orders granting the 
government’s motions it is necessary in the interest of justice that Lopez be granted a 
new trial.”  (App. at 15.)  The Court elaborated on that reasoning in a later order 
addressing the government’s motion for reconsideration.  Responding to the 
government’s contention that it need do nothing more than “adopt[] a provided rationale 
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offered by the government” (App. at 8), the Court concluded that, while that may be true, 
it simply had not done so.  At no point had it actually indicated that it agreed with and 
adopted the government’s rationale.  (App. at 10.)  After a “painstakingly comprehensive 
review” of the case file, the District Court concluded that it should grant Lopez a new 
trial.  (App. at 7.) 
 The government then filed this timely appeal.   
II. DISCUSSION2 
 Upon a defendant’s motion, “the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new 
trial if the interest of justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).  The determination of 
whether to grant a new trial is left to the discretion of the district court.  United States v. 
Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006).  Therefore, we generally review a ruling on a 
motion for a new trial under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.  United States 
v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010).  “We have explained that a district court 
abuses its discretion if its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “[T]he district court’s latitude on a new trial motion is broad when the 
reason for interfering with the jury verdict is a ruling on a matter that initially rested 
within the discretion of the court, e.g. evidentiary rulings … .”  Klein v. Hollings, 992 
F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1993). 
                                              
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 
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 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides a general prohibition on character 
evidence and limits the permissible uses of such evidence: 
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character. … This evidence may be admissible 
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident. 
 
In recognition of the fact that a jury might place undue weight on evidence of past 
wrongs, American courts have long excluded it.  United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 
440 (3d Cir. 2013).  “The risk is that jurors will focus on evidence of prior acts, believing 
that someone with a criminal record cannot change and discounting any evidence to the 
contrary.”  Id. at 441.  “The government knows this, and we do too.  Although the 
government will hardly admit it, the reasons proffered to admit prior bad act evidence 
may often be potemkin village, because the motive, we suspect, is often mixed between 
an urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to impugn the defendant’s 
character.”  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In light of the potential for prejudice that inheres in such evidence, and the mixed 
motives that can accompany a request for its admission, “we also require care and 
precision by the district court in ruling on the admission of prior act evidence for a non-
propensity purpose.”  United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2014).  As 
relevant here, a district court must engage in a two-step analysis when considering 
whether to admit prior convictions under Rule 404(b).  Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886.  First, 
it must assess whether the conviction is logically relevant to one of the permissible 
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purposes identified by the rule.  Id.  Second, even if the prior conviction is relevant to 
such a purpose, a district court must then apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and assess 
whether “the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”  Id.3 
 At the first step of the analysis, the government must proffer some “logical chain 
of inferences” through which the prior conviction is relevant to one of Rule 404(b)’s 
permitted purposes.  Id. at 888.  The reasoning must come before, not after, the decision 
to admit the evidence.  “The district court, if it admits the evidence, must in the first 
instance, rather than the appellate court in retrospect, articulate reasons why the evidence 
also goes to show something other than character. … The district court must put a chain 
of inferences into the record, none of which is the inference that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit this crime.”  Id.  We have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of 
the district court placing its reasoning on the record, independent of the government’s 
proffer.  United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 294 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Lopez, 340 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2003).  “The reasoning should be detailed and on the 
record; a mere recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is insufficient.”  Davis, 726 
F.3d at 442. 
 We need go no further.  To state the governing rule is to resolve this case.  As the 
District Court itself recognized, it did not articulate any reason why Lopez’s prior 
conviction was admissible under Rule 404(b), nor did it in any way adopt the 
                                              
 3 The district court also “must charge the jury to consider the other crimes 
evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted.”  United States v. Kellogg, 
510 F.3d 188, 199 n.10 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, the Court did provide a limiting instruction, 
admonishing the jury to consider the conviction only for the permissible purposes present 
in Rule 404(b) and not as propensity evidence.   
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government’s proffered reasoning.  It is not our role to supply a post hoc rationale for the 
admission of evidence where one is wanting.  “[O]ur decisions are … emphatic in 
requiring the proponent and the trial judge to articulate, with precision, a chain of 
inferences that does not contain a propensity link.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277 (emphasis 
added).  To its credit, the District Court recognized its error in failing to address the 
important issues presented by the admission of Lopez’s prior conviction and acted well 
within its discretion in granting a new trial. 
 The government’s argument to the contrary is primarily focused on the merits – 
that is, the contention that the 2001 conviction is admissible under Rule 404(b).  See 
United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the relevance under 
Rule 404(b) of prior drug distribution offenses).  That may be true, and the grant of a new 
trial does not foreclose that possibility.  But we will not pass on that question before the 
District Court conducts its own analysis and places its reasoning on the record.  We 
express no opinion as to the government’s arguments on the merits of its in limine 
motion, which are properly addressed to the District Court in the first instance.4 
                                              
 4 The government also argues that the District Court was without authority to grant 
a new trial because the issue was “not raised by the defendant” in his motion for new 
trial.  (Opening Br. at 21.)  That contention is unpersuasive.  Lopez’s motion for a new 
trial addressed a single issue – the admission of his 2001 conviction.  Although he 
focused his argument on the merits of the decision to admit the conviction rather than the 
District Court’s failure to justify its decision, he repeatedly referred to the Court’s lack of 
support for its decision and cited our precedent establishing the proper two-step 
procedure for the admission of prior convictions under Rule 404(b).  In his motion, Lopez 
emphasized that the Court had “generally granted” the government’s in limine motion 
(App. at 37), and in a supporting memorandum of law, Lopez noted that the Court “did 
not provide analysis of the Court’s decision granting the government’s January 20, 2012 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
Lopez’s motion for a new trial. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Court’s second opinion also “ordered the admission of Mr. Lopez’s 2001 Delaware state 
felony drug conviction in conclusory fashion without a detailed analysis or specific 
rationale for the decision.”  (App. at 47.) 
 
